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Abstract 
Using the simulation model Land Use in Rural New Zealand version 1 -
climate (LURNZv1-climate), we simulate the effects of an agricultural land-use 
emissions charge and a reward for native forest and scrub regeneration. Our 
results are preliminary and at this stage should be considered illustrative. We find 
that, on its own, an agricultural emissions charge based on solely on land use 
would be disruptive and may not be very effective in reducing emissions. In 
addition, we find that including an additional policy that rewards regenerating 
forest and scrub without a similar reward for plantation forestry might negatively 
impact on plantation forestry, increasing emissions growth in the short-run. We 
are currently developing a second version of LURNZ-climate, which will be more 
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Policies designed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions through the 
Kyoto Protocol have the potential to create political firestorms. In 2003, the 
government proposed the ill-fated “fart” tax – this small research levy ignited a 
damaging political firestorm despite representing a charge of only 25 cents per 
tonne carbon dioxide equivalent. This levy pales in comparison to the price of 
European Union Allowances, which have exceeded NZ$50 per tonne in March 
and April 2006 before falling back dramatically. Was the outrage all hot air? We 
use the simulation model Land Use in Rural New Zealand – climate (LURNZ–
climate) to explore the impacts of high emissions charges (NZ$50 per tonne) on 
productive land uses including dairying, sheep and beef agriculture, and forestry. 
The results demonstrate the potential connections between greenhouse gas 
mitigation policies across sectors. We examine the large economic and potentially 
quite small emissions impacts that could result from exposing agriculture to the 
international emissions price. We also examine the land use and emissions 
implications of proposed policies that would give landowners emissions credits 
for regenerating indigenous forest and scrub. In the absence of a parallel policy 
for production forestry, the results are surprising and potentially disappointing for 
proponents of biodiversity. 
2 About  LURNZ-climate 
To examine the impacts of devolving Kyoto credits and liabilities for 
emissions and sinks to land owners, economists at Motu Economic and Public 
Policy Research, and scientists at institutes including Landcare Research, 
AgResearch, Scion/Ensis (Forest Research), and NIWA have combined their 
efforts to develop LURNZ-climate. Based on economics and natural science, 
LURNZ-climate is a computer model that simulates the effect of climate change 
related government policies on rural land use in New Zealand. LURNZ-climate 
predicts land-use change at a fine spatial scale over the whole country, producing 
dynamic paths of rural land-use change and maps of rural land use across 
New  Zealand. In addition, LURNZ-climate calculates the greenhouse gas 
implications of land-use change. With the development of LURNZ-climate, 2 
New Zealand now has the capacity to empirically investigate the potential impacts 
of policies designed to alter land-use decisions, including policies such as a charge 
to farmers in proportion to the amount of methane and nitrous oxide their 
livestock emit and a reward for regenerating indigenous forest and scrub.  
The first version of LURNZ-climate, LURNZv1-climate, is now 
operational. LURNZv1-climate models land-use change on 25ha grid-cells in a 
grid covering New  Zealand for four major rural land uses: dairy farming, 
sheep/beef farming, plantation forestry, and regenerating indigenous forest and 
scrub. In addition, LURNZv1-climate calculates the emissions impacts of these 
land uses for the three most important land use related greenhouse gases: methane, 
nitrous oxide, and carbon dioxide.  
We built the LURNZv1-climate database by collecting and enhancing 
existing datasets describing land characteristics, including land cover, land use, 
economics, governance, geophysical variables and greenhouse gas data. The 
database also includes data on greenhouse gas emissions and removals related to 
each land use. The land use and cover variables come from the Ministry for the 
Environment’s Land Cover Database (LCDB), which is based on satellite 
measurements of land cover, and agricultural surveys and censuses. The economic 
variables include commodity prices, yields, revenues and expenditures, costs of 
land use transitions, amenities, and land values. The governance variables include 
maps of conservation and Maori owned land. The geophysical variables include 
existing maps such as land-use capability, soil, climate, slope, and land-use-
specific productivity indices developed specifically for this project. The 
greenhouse gas data include methane and nitrous oxide emissions for dairy, sheep, 
and beef livestock, and fertiliser, and measures of removal of carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere by plantation forestry and regenerating indigenous forest and 
scrub. They come from the data collected for the 2002 National Inventory report 
(Brown and Plume, 2004) with additional information from Landcare Research 
(Hendy and Kerr, 2005). 
The land use component of the model is based upon a micro-economic 
theoretical model that assumes landowners choose the land use that will give them 
the highest economic return, depending on potential returns, conversion costs, and 3 
relative uncertainties associated with the different land uses. To develop 
LURNZv1, we derived hypotheses from this theory and then statistically tested 
them against actual data. In doing this, we estimated the relationship between 
national level land use and prices, interest rates, area of non-rural land, and the 
average trend in all unobserved factors such as costs and relative uncertainties, 
using 29 years of historical data; this process is explained in more detail in Kerr 
and Hendy (2006). LURNZv1 uses these estimated relationships to predict short 
run land-use adjustment to economic shocks and long run equilibrium land use at 
the national level. LURNZv1 then uses spatial algorithms to map predicted 
changes across New  Zealand, based on the assumption that, in response to an 
economic shock, it is marginal land that will change land use first. LURNZv1 is 
explained in more detail in Hendy, Kerr, and Baisden (2006). 
The greenhouse gas module in LURNZv1-climate includes functions 
that project land-use related greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic 
activity. The functions are simple; are based on readily available data and strong 
science; are consistent with the national inventory in 2002; evolve so that implied 
net emissions approximately match past inventory totals (1990-2002); and can be 
linked easily to a variety of models so they can be used in simulations. Combined 
with simple projections of the intensity of land-use for each land-use type, the 
greenhouse gas module calculates emissions associated with one hectare of each 
land use. This is explained in more detail in Hendy and Kerr (2005) and Hendy 
and Kerr (2006). Finally, combining the predictions of land-use change with the 
projections of land-use emissions per hectare, LURNZv1-climate calculates the 
emissions implications of land-use change.  
For the remainder of this article we discuss results produced from 
LURNZv1-climate. Given that the relationships driving the land-use responses in 
LURNZv1-climate are still under development, the underlying mechanisms of the 
model will be examined further before results can be considered robust in terms of 
timing or magnitude. Thus, the results presented should be taken as qualitative 
illustrations of issues arising from the modelled policies. 4 
3  Charging farmers for their land-use 
emissions 
As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, the government is obliged to 
reduce New Zealand’s annual emissions to the 1990 level during the 2008-2012 
period or buy assigned amount units on the international market to make up the 
difference. Although agricultural emissions have been rising at a much slower rate 
than New Zealand’s overall emissions, in which growth is driven largely driven 
by the transport sector, agricultural land use emissions, caused mostly by methane 
produced by grazing animals and nitrous oxide derived from animal excrement, 
constitute approximately half of New Zealand’s overall greenhouse gas emissions 
(Brown and Plume, 2004). Therefore, reducing land-use emissions could 
significantly help New  Zealand to meet its target and contribute efficiently to 
controlling greenhouse gases. A potential policy to help encourage emission 
reductions would be to charge farmers in proportion to the amount of emissions 
that their animal production produces. This would lead farmers to reduce area in 
livestock and particularly in dairy, reduce stocking rates and, if possible, change 
farm management to reduce emissions per animal. Current methane and nitrous 
oxide monitoring technology makes accurate animal or farm-scale monitoring of 
emissions impossible. The proposed policy related payments only to livestock 
numbers, which can be monitored. Because of current limitations in LURNZ, we 
model an even simpler policy where the government simply charges farmers in 
proportion to their land area in each land use, and assumes that each farm emits an 
average amount per hectare. This is a less flexible policy because farmers cannot 
change their stocking rates in response to the charge. We therefore underestimate 
the size of the likely response to a charge based on livestock numbers. 
If dairy farmers were charged $50 for every tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emitted in 2002, based on average values, their income would decrease 
60 cents for each kilogram of milk solids that they produced. On average in 2002, 
farmers received $5.31 per kilogram of milk solids, so this charge would have 
equated to an 11% reduction in revenue. If sheep/beef farmers were charged the 
same amount per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent, they would pay 85 cents for 
every kilogram of combined meat and wool, equivalent to a 22% reduction in 
revenue. The impact of these revenue reductions can be measured against net 5 
profits, which were $126,469 for dairy farms and $113,303 for sheep/beef farms 
when averaged over the last five years (New Zealand. Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 2001-2005a and 2001-2005b). This charge would have reduced net 
profits by $48,693 for the average dairy farm and $38,116  for the average 
sheep/beef farm. These impacts would directly lower land values and hence 
farmer wealth. 
The charge would also affect people other than farmers, as the indirect 
effects would spread out through the economy. Farmers, who would have to pay 
the huge cost, would likely reduce their spending. This would negatively affect 
their communities, in particular including laying off farm workers or lowering 
their wages. Farm workers in return would reduce their own expenditure. Thus, 
the effects of the charge would flow on through the economy. Sin et al (2004) 
found that the areas likely to be hardest hit by an emissions charge would be Gore 
and MacKenzie in the South Island, and Taihape, Waipukurau, Te Kuiti and 
Dannevirke in the North Island. The effect on the economy as a whole may not be 
large after an initial period of adjustment if the revenue from the charge were 
recycled into other tax cuts, but the transfers of income between people and the 
dislocation in some communities would be significant. 
In response to such a policy, some marginal land is likely to change to a 
lower emitting land use. If, for example, sheep/beef farming on a parcel of 
marginal land is no longer profitable, the land is likely to enter plantation forestry 
or a state, which we refer to as regenerating forest and scrub, in which no 
economic activity is discernable. It is also likely that some land will move from 
dairy to sheep/beef (or not convert to dairy as soon – if dairy prices and 
conversions continue to be high). For example, facing such a charge, farms 
considering converting to dairy would find that the difference between their 
current returns in sheep/beef farming and the returns they could potentially earn in 
dairy would be reduced. This is because dairy farming has higher emissions per 
hectare than sheep/beef farming so they face a higher charge. For some farms on 
the margin for conversion to dairy, this effect might be large enough to make 
sheep/beef more profitable than dairy, and so these farms might choose not to 
convert and thereby reduce New  Zealand’s total emissions. In all cases, the 6 
resulting land-use changes will result in lower emitting land use, achieving the 
goal of the policy. However, the costs to enterprises and rural economies may be 
sufficiently large that the policy is not currently justified, relative to other policies 
that would induce emissions reductions in other sectors.  
To examine the impact of a NZ$50 per tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent charge on New  Zealand agriculture, we ask, how big would the 
corresponding emissions reductions be? To answer this, we first need to know 
what would have happened if no policy was introduced. To tell us this, we 
simulate a reference case scenario. The reference case gives us a line against 
which we can measure the effectiveness of the policy, allowing us to observe the 
magnitude of the policy effect and discern whether the policy is achieving its 
intended result. 
Figure 1  Emissions under different policy scenarios 
 
2006 2009 
















































Policy scenario 2: 
agricultural emissions 
charge and scrubland 
carbon dioxide removals 
reward
 
For our reference case, we project changes in land use and emissions 
from 2003 to 2012, using Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry forecasts of 
commodity prices and assuming that both the interest rate and the area of non-7 
rural land are constant. Based on this scenario, LURNZv1 projects that by 2012 
dairy area will expand by 1.2% (18,000ha), sheep/beef area will contract by 2.8% 
(199,000ha), plantation forestry will expand by 17.4% (273,000ha), and 
regenerating forest and scrub will contract by 5.5% (92,000ha) compared to 2002. 
The solid line in the figure shows the corresponding agricultural emissions for the 
reference case over the period. The emissions are calculated as total methane and 
nitrous oxide emissions from dairy, sheep, and beef livestock, and fertiliser use, 
net of carbon dioxide removed by plantation forests and regenerating indigenous 
forest and scrub.  
To find out how much the charge would reduce emissions, we model 
the charge as a reduction in the commodity price that farmers receive, assuming 
that farmers will respond to the charge in the same way as a commodity price 
shock. From 2003 onwards, we reduce the commodity prices relative to those we 
used in the reference case by the equivalent of 60 cents for milk solids and 85 
cents for meat and wool; these reductions correspond to a charge of $50 per tonne 
of carbon dioxide equivalent. We expect that, when compared to the reference 
case, dairy would expand less, sheep/beef would contract more, plantation forests 
would expand more, and regenerating forest and scrub would contract less. As a 
result, we expect that the rise in emissions would be reduced and indeed this is the 
case. The dashed line in the figure shows net emissions associated with this 
scenario.  
We find that dairy area contracts by 1% with the policy, whereas in the 
reference case it expanded by 1.2%. Sheep/beef area contracts by 0.3 percentage 
points more than in the reference case, plantation forestry stays about the same, 
and regenerating forest and scrub contracts by 3.8 percentage points less than in 
the reference case. The land-use change caused by the policy reduces the annual 
growth rate in emissions during 2003 – 2012 from about 0.5 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent per year in the reference case to about 0.4 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year.  
The lower emissions rate from a charge based on land use equates to a 
6% relative reduction in emissions over the first commitment period. This is a 
small reduction for a large emissions price. The result therefore suggests that an 8 
emissions tax levied on agriculture will result in relatively small reductions in 
emissions, relative to reductions in the profitability of farming that are likely to 
flow through the economy. Thus, a policy levying an emissions charge on 
agriculture based on emissions per hectare remains a relatively poor policy option, 
presuming that significant impacts on land values rural workers and rural 
communities cannot be addressed. It is possible however, that the current model 
underestimates the magnitude of change that could be achieved through slightly 
more targeted policies. A more sophisticated policy, such as a policy where the 
government monitored livestock numbers and fertiliser use within each land use, 
could give more dimensions along which farmers could reduce their emissions.  
4  Rewarding farmers for regeneration of 
marginal land 
The Government might be able to induce a greater reduction in 
emissions and at the same time reduce the impact on farmers, if the government 
rewarded the regeneration of indigenous forest and scrub on marginal land. The 
Government has developed a policy called the Permanent Forest Sinks Initiative 
(PFSI) that would provide such an alternative. In addition to lowering agricultural 
emissions by reducing the land area in agriculture, the PFSI would encourage 
landowners to sequester carbon in forest biomass (Trotter et al., 2005). Reversion 
of native forest also has other benefits, including on biodiversity (Hall, 2001) and 
water quality. These are not considered further here. 
We simulate the effect of awarding farmers $50 for every tonne of 
carbon dioxide equivalent that is removed from the atmosphere by native forest 
regeneration from 2003 to 2012 as well as charging them for their livestock 
emissions as in the previous simulation. For this policy, farmers would be 
rewarded in proportion to the national average rate of carbon dioxide removals for 
every hectare that they set aside.  
Under this scenario, if farmers set aside land in 2003, the annualized net 
present value over the next ten years would be $53 per hectare per year, assuming 
a 6% discount rate. This value can be compared with annual costs due to 
emissions charges of $149 and $433 per hectare annually in sheep/beef and dairy 9 
farming, respectively. These different charges and rewards alter relative returns, 
and we expect that some marginal dairy land would convert to sheep/beef land, 
and some marginal sheep/beef land would be allowed to regenerate native 
vegetation. Thus, in this scenario, there is potential to reduce emissions even 
more, with more land changing toward lower emitting land uses.  
Surprisingly, this does not happen. When we compare net emissions in 
this scenario to net emissions from the previous scenario, which only includes the 
emissions charge, we find that introducing the reward actually increases emissions 
growth. In fact, not only does the policy result in greater emissions than the case 
of the emissions charge on its own, it results in greater emissions than the 
reference case. We find that this policy results in annual emissions growth during 
2003 – 2012 greater than the reference case by about 0.1Mt of carbon dioxide 
equivalent; this is illustrated by the dotted line in the figure. 
The reason for this unexpected result is that regenerating forest and 
scrub compete with plantation forestry for land. Regenerating forest and scrub 
expansion has occurred at the expense of plantation forestry expansion and 
consequently, plantation forestry area expands at a slower rate in this scenario 
than in the previous scenarios. Net emissions increase because young regenerating 
forest and scrub remove much less carbon dioxide from the atmosphere than 
young plantation forests. This is a short-term problem; in the long run, removals 
by naturally regenerating vegetation surpass those by plantation forestry. 
However, this effect would actually make meeting our obligations for the first 
Kyoto commitment period more difficult.  
This result suggests that the PFSI has the potential to achieve a 
‘perverse’ result during 2008–2012, by actually making New  Zealand’s net 
position under the Kyoto Protocol worse. Rather than suggesting that the PFSI is 
poor policy, this result emphasizes that even policies with the potential to produce 
multiple environmental benefits such as the PFSI must be considered as part of an 
overall picture. In this case, the PFSI would be enhanced if plantation forestry 
were rewarded for carbon sequestration as well. Our preliminary results suggest 
that the government should consider also rewarding plantation forestry 
particularly if they want short-term emission gains.  10 
Similarly, the impacts of levying a charge on land use related emissions 
from agriculture would ideally be examined in the context of carbon charges or 
emissions trading in the fossil fuel sector. This is not possible with any current 
model.  
5 Summary 
These illustrative simulations demonstrate that LURNZv1-climate is a 
useful tool for analysing potential greenhouse gas mitigation policies intended to 
reward or tax emissions resulting from land use activities. Our first simulation 
indicates that an agricultural emissions charge based simply on land use would be 
highly disruptive and may not be very effective in reducing emissions. Our second 
simulation shows that the inclusion of a reward for regenerating forest and scrub 
without a similar reward for plantation forestry might negatively impact on 
plantation forestry, increasing emissions growth in the short-run. This 
demonstrates the potential for policies to have unintended, and potentially 
perverse impacts when policies are not aligned across sectors.  
The model results illustrate the importance of careful empirical analysis 
of potential policies, and emphasize the need for tools such as LURNZ that are 
applicable to New  Zealand’s unique situation. The results presented here are 
preliminary in that they illustrate the probable scale and direction of policy 
impacts but the exact size of those impacts may not be robust. We are currently 
developing a second version of LURNZ-climate, which will be much more robust, 
and thus lend more weight to our future results.  
Finally, when developing LURNZv1-climate we used publicly available 
data whenever it was available. We did this to support our aim of making both 
LURNZ-climate and the LURNZ-climate database freely available for research 
purposes whenever possible. We hope others will use our data and model to 
explore these issues further. For more information, please visit 
www.motu.org.nz/land_use_nz.htm. 11 
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